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Abstract
Petrus Hispanus discusses relation in two different contexts of the Tractatus. The first 
context is treatise III, about categories. The second is treatise VIII, where he theorizes the 
relative terms inside the context of supposition and the properties of terms. In this paper, 
after identifying Petrus Hispanus’s theories and sources, the two contexts are compared 
with each other. It is concluded that there are similarities of treatment between the two 
different issues and that they are a shortcut to understand metaphysical tendencies. Also, 
in what concerns a specific kind of relative terms — relatives of diversity — there is a 
clear distinction between reference and supposition, which opens a space to some kind of 
mediation between things and language. 
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Resumen. Ad aliquid y relatiuum. Relación y teoría de suposición en el Tractatus de Petrus 
Hispanus
Petrus Hispanus aborda la relación en dos contextos distintos del Tractatus. El primer 
contexto es el tratado III, sobre las categorías. El segundo es el tratado VIII, donde teo-
riza sobre los términos relativos dentro del contexto de la suposición y la propiedad de 
los términos. En este artículo, tras identificar las teorías y fuentes de Petrus Hispanus, 
se comparan ambos contextos. Se concluye que hay semejanzas en el modo de tratar las 
dos distintas cuestiones y que ayudan a entender tendencias metafísicas. Por otro lado, 
en cuanto a un específico tipo de términos relativos —relativos de diversidad— se da 
una distinción clara entre referencia y suposición, que abre un espacio para algún tipo de 
mediación entre las cosas y el lenguaje.
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Introduction
The Tractatus (also known as Summulae logicales) were probably the most read 
and commented companion to logic of the whole Middle Ages. In addition to 
transmitting the fundamental contents of the Aristotelian logic (interpreted in 
the light of Boethius’ commentaries), we find in some of these treatises elements 
that constitute a true innovation of scholasticism — the treatises on the prop-
erties of terms. There seems to be a clear division between those treatises that 
report the doctrines of the Aristotelian Organon and those that develop the 
theory of supposition and its consequences, but this division is not absolute at 
all. On the one hand, the theory of supposition (and of the properties of terms 
in general), although based on grammatical theories transmitted by Priscian 
(especially the so-called Priscianus minor, i.e., the last two books of the Institu-
tiones Grammaticae), deals with the contextual variation of the scope of a term. 
There are in this treatment many procedures which, although not explicitly 
formulated, could be considered Aristotle’s implicit semantic rules, as De Rijk 
did (cf. De Rijk, 2013: 15-28). One of the most operative tools to overcome 
difficulties in the Aristotelian thought is ambivalence of language. It is this 
ambivalence that allows Aristotle to overcome some dead ends of Platonic ideas. 
Just to give an example, he can coherently use the same noun to point out either 
some particular feature of an individual or this same feature intellectually sep-
arated from its inherence in that individual without having to posit a separate 
existence. De Rijk considers the example of the ambivalent use of ousia for three 
different things: a physical particular (or a primary substance), the eidos that is 
responsible for the subsistence of something and ‘being-ness’ in general (cf. De 
Rijk, 2013: 16-17). This ambivalence demands strict rules to know what is 
being said, for the sake of philosophical righteousness. This is precisely the 
purpose of the medieval theories of the properties of terms. Thus, it can be said 
that the theories of the properties of terms are simultaneously innovative and 
in continuity with Aristotelian basic assumptions.
Hereupon, I intend to set up a possible parallel between an element of 
aristotelian logic and another element of the theory of supposition in the 
Tractatus, namely, the treatment of the category of relation in Tractatus III (De 
praedicamentis) and the treatment of relative terms in Tratactus VIII (De rela-
tivis). Although early on the Tractatus VIII Petrus Hispanus makes the remark 
that one must clearly distinguish relation as a category from relative terms as 
“reminder of a thing before said” (rei antelate recordativum), there are howev-
er similarities in the theoretical approach to this two themes.
1. De ad aliquid
As mentioned before, Petrus Hispanus starts his Tractatus VIII about relatives 
distinguishing two kinds of relative:
Relativum est duplex. Uno enim modo est relativum cuius esse est ad aliud 
quodammodo se habere; et sic relativum est unum de decem predicamentis. 
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Alio autem modo relativum est rei antelate recordatio […]. Omissis autem 
relativis secundum primum modum, de relativis secundo modo intedimus hic 
(Petrus Hispanus, 1972, VIII, 1: 185).
The most natural attitude of the interpreter should be to separate this two 
topics, i.e., relation as category and relation as “reminder of a thing before 
said”. In a first stage of this investigation, I will do so. I will start by exposing 
the category of relation in the third treatise and then relative terms in the 
eighth, contextualizing it inside the more general theory of supposition. Then, 
I will compare this two elements and identify the parallelisms between them.
Petrus Hispanus is not an innovator in his exposition of the Aristotelian 
doctrine of the categories or predicaments. Comparing the Aristotelian text 
with his, it could be said that it is almost a copy, with some additions from 
Physics in the explanation of inherence (being in), and from Liber sex princip-
iorum when expounding two accidents, namely action and passion. Neverthe-
less, it must be said that he was one of the first authors of a compendium of 
logic that considered important to include a treatise on categories. Indeed, it 
was not a unanimous practice.
Let’s begin wih the comparison between the Aristotelian text translated by 
Boethius and the text from Tractatus III:
Aristotle (translatio Boetii)
Ad aliquid vero talia dicuntur quae-
cumque hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum 
dicuntur, vel quomodolibet aliter ad 
aliud, ut maius hoc ipsum quod est 
ad aliud dicitur (aliquo enim maius 
dicitur), et duplex ad aliud dicitur hoc 
ipsum quod est (alicuius enim duplex 
dicitur); similiter autem et quaecum-
que alia talia sunt (Aristoteles Latinus, 
1961: 13).
Petrus Hispanus
Ad aliquid vero talia dicuntur quecum-
que hoc ipsum quod sunt, aliorum esse 
dicuntur, vel quomodolibet aliter ad 
aliud. Ut duplum dimidii duplum et 
dimidium dupli dimidium, et pater 
filii pater et filius patris filius, et maius 
minore maius, et simile simili simile 
(Petrus Hispanus, 1972, III, 17: 34).
The only difference is in the examples. After giving the definition of the 
category of relation (ad aliquid, literally “to something” or “towards some-
thing”) copied from Boethius’ translation, Petrus Hispanus makes a threefold 
division of the relative things (or twofold, because two of them are correlatives):
Relativorum quedam dicuntur secundum equiparantiam, ut que eodem 
nomine dicuntur, ut similis simili similis et equalis equali equalis et vicinus 
vicino vicinus. Alia vero secundum superpositionem, ut dominus, duplum, 
triplum. Alia vero secundum suppositionem, ut servus, subduplum, sub-
triplum, quia ista supponuntur aliis et alia superponuntur istis. Dominus 
enim superponitur servo et pater filio et duplum dimidio; servus vero sup-
ponitur domino et filius patri et dimidium duplo (Petrus Hispanus, 1972, 
III, 18: 34)
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Also this division is not original. It can be found both in the book V of 
Metaphysics and in Boethius’ commentary to Categories. Petrus Hispanus prob-
ably inspires himself in Boethius. This author makes a similar classification, 
although with different names. Boethius points out that there are things that 
we relate by predicating the same name in different cases (nominative, geni-
tive, etc.) and other things by predicating different names. In his own words:
Eorum autem quae secundum casus convertuntur, alia sunt quae eodem 
nomine praedicantur, alia vero quae dispari: cum enim dico simile simili simile 
est, et aequale aequali aequale est, et dissimile dissimili dissimile est, eisdem 
vocabulis eisdemque nomine tota fit praedicatio. Cum autem dico duplum 
medii duplum, vel majus minore majus, disparibus vocabulis facta est praed-
icatio (Boetius, 1997: 219B-C).
In the first type of things, that “are converted according to the case” (quae 
convertuntur secundum casus), we can find the petrinian relatives of equiparance, 
as “similar”, which is similar to the similar; in the second, we have the pair 
superpositum-suppositum, such as “double”, which is the double of its half. 
Boethius also mentions certain things that, without being convertible in the 
case, still can be considered relations, although not univocally. They are rela-
tions denominatively, such as position, which ends up being a proper category.
Petrus Hispanus continues establishing the common properties of relation. 
It is also a copy, almost verbatim, of the boethian translation, in which the 
only differences are the fact that he doesn’t take care of a discussion about the 
necessity of inventing names to some correlatives that don’t have a proper 
word, and the fact that he resumes some long expositions in a small phrase. 
Here is what he considers common to relation: some relative things admit 
contrariety and others don’t; some relative things admit grading (more and 
less) and others don’t; all the relative things are said with respect to their cor-
relative, i.e., ad convertentiam; they have a simultaneous nature, and so they 
reappear in the explanation of the various meanings of simultaneity in the 
post-predicaments; when someone poses or supresses some relative thing, he 
poses or supresses equally its correlative; if someone knows the definition of a 
correlative, he knows the definition of the other. Between the fifth and the 
sixth properties, Petrus Hispanus gives, copying Aristotle, a slightly different 
definition of relation: ad aliquid sunt quibus hoc ipsum esse est ad aliud quodam-
modo se habere (Petrus Hispanus, 1972, III, 20: 35). This second definition is 
more restrictive, since only those things that are related in their own being 
(hoc ipsum esse) are considered ad aliquid.
Through this brief exposition suppositio appeared in a conceptual pair as a 
class of relatives, that is, posed under the things that are posed above them. This 
suppositio is not the same as the fundamental property of terms, which shows 
that Petrus Hispanus is mixing terminology from different origins.1 However, 
1. The translators to English, Brian Copenhaver, Calvin Normore and Terence Parsons took 
the option to use the words “subordinate” and “superordinate” to translate the pair suppo-
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as we shall see, supposition is a relation of subordination, or of “putting 
under”, i.e., a suppositum is put under a term. Of course that this is not a 
relation as it is treated in the third treatise. Still, this parallelism is not innoc-
uous. Before we get to a more concrete conclusion, we shall enter in the eighth 
treatise, devoted to relative terms as “reminders of things before said”.
2. De relativis
Before we can start talking properly about relatives, we must contextualize the 
appearence of the theories of supposition, present Petrus Hispanus’s definition 
of it and enframe the function of relative terms on it. Breafly (cf. De Rijk, 
1996: 161-173; Ebbesen, 2007: 136-152), the development of a semantic 
theory about the properties of terms, especially between the 13th and the 14th 
centuries, is due to the use of classifications imported from grammar. The main 
sources of this classification are the last two books of Priscian’s Institutiones 
Grammaticae. In this work, Priscian is deeply influenced by a grammarian with 
strong stoic influences: Apollonius Disculus. Maybe because of that, and given 
the fact that his knowledge of Aristotelianism and Platonism was precarious, 
much of his doctrines is incompatible with the medieval Aristotelian concep-
tual framework. This inadequacy made medieval logicians look for ingenious 
solutions to overcome flaws and incoherences (cf. Ebbesen, 2009: 85-107). In 
Priscian, supposition is an attempt to explain the need for a substrate in which 
qualities occur (in the stoic sense of quality) and so, for him supposition is 
positing a name as a subject of qualities (cf. Luhtala, 2009: 109-124). Howev-
er, as was stated above, it is possible to find within the works of Aristotle 
implicit semantic strategies that inspire the treatment of supposition.
But what is supposition? It must be compared to signification. Petrus His-
panus defines it like this:
Suppositio vero est acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo. Differunt autem 
suppositio et significatio, quia significatio est per impositionem vocis ad rem 
significandam, suppositio vero est acceptio ipsius termini iam significantis rem 
pro aliquo (Petrus Hispanus, 1972, VI, 3: 80).
Signification is the conventional representation of a thing by a vox (elocu-
tion, word). Signification transforms a vox in a term. The term, in turn, can 
supposit. In other words, it can be in the place of something else in a certain 
context. A term signifies some form and supposits for a class of things that have 
this form in common. This class supposited by the term can vary according 
 
situm-superpositum. In the introduction, they identify three different uses of suppositio. Two 
of them are syntactical distinctions made with the pair supponere-apponere. This pair is used 
sometimes to distinguish the subject from the object and other times to distinguish the 
subject from the predicate. When supponere appears alone, it is used as a property of terms. 
They also identify all the passages where this name occurs. Cf. Copenhaver et al., 2014, 
Intr. V, I: 62-63.
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to context. Also, in particular uses, the term can also be taken separately from 
its contextual variations, or absolutely. It is the case of suppositio naturalis, 
where a term is taken in all its scope, in all the possibilities that are natural to 
it2. To give a simple example, the term “man” has only one signification, but 
according to its use, it can supposit for many different things: for a universal 
shared by all the things naturally fit to being called “man” (past, present and 
future, real and hypothetical) or it can supposit for present actual men exist-
ing at this moment; if it supposits for real actual existing men, it can suppos-
it for them without suppositing for what underlies them, such as being bald, 
hairy, black, white, thin, fat, etc. According to the different kind of supposi-
tion, the truth conditions of a predication completely alter. I will not enter 
deeply on the petrinian taxonomy of the divisions of supposition (common 
and discrete, the common in natural and accidental, etc.). It is enough for our 
purpose to say that this classification is highly variable from author to author 
and that this variation is due to both logical (for example, the problem of 
discrete terms) and metaphysical problems (for example, to know if some 
terms supposit for some ratio or intentio of a thing that does not depend on 
the way this thing is but on the way we have access to it).
The approach to relative terms in the eighth treatise is due to the attempt 
to find rules to identify the kind of supposition envolved in the use of a term 
that is replacing another term. A relative term, following Priscian’s Institutiones 
Grammaticae, is defined as rei antelate recordatio, “remembrance of the thing 
before said”, such as qui, ille, talis, alius, alter. They are said with relation to 
an antecedent and either they repeat their suppositum or exclude it. In this 
context of relative terms, Petrus Hispanus explicitly distinguishes reference 
from supposition in order to explain the relatives of diversity. Hence, it is not 
very useful to use supposition and reference as synonyms. He divides relative 
terms in terms of substance and terms of accident. The first ones refer to 
something equal in number to its antecedent and the second ones refer an 
accident equal in species (not in number) to its antecedent. Both, if they are 
relatives of identity, supposit for the same as their antecedent; if they are rela-
tives of diversity, they supposit for something different from their antecedent. 
The relatives of identity are subdivided in reflective and non-reflective. What 
is important to underline for our purpose is that Petrus Hispanus distinguish-
es the fact that relative terms point out to the content of other terms (refer-
ence) from their aptitude to “be in the place of something else” (supposition). 
This two features don’t always coincide, as in the case of terms like “other”, 
“different”, “diverse”, etc. When we use them, we must recall the term they 
refer to, but they supposit exactly for what this term doesn’t supposit for. 
Although Petrus Hispanus doesn’t say it in this context, this shows our intelec-
tual capacity to separate three elements: the linguistic representation of a thing 
by means of a term (significatio); that which this representation demands to 
2. “Suppositio naturalis est acceptio termini communis pro omnibus a quibus aptus natus est 
participari” (Petrus Hispanus, 1972, VI, 4: 81).
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be presented in order to be in the place of something else, or its reference; the 
“something” that the term supposits for (the suppositum). We can find in this 
little intermediate step between signification and supposition the idea that 
there is something intentional or mental that mediates the relation between 
words and things. Petrus Hispanus doesn’t speak about this mediation when 
speaking about supposition, and didn’t theorize explicitly about it, but he 
surely makes use of it many times, as when he needs to explain some fallacies 
in the seventh treatise3.
3. Parallelisms
Through the explanation of Petrus Hispanus’s theory of supposition, “being in 
the place of something else” was central. It is this “being in the place of some-
thing else” that makes me consider that supposition in general and relative 
terms in particular have similarities of treatment with a particular kind of the 
category of relation — the relatives according to superpositio and suppositio. A 
term “puts under” it a suppositum. Supposition can be seen as the relation of 
subordinating a reality to a term that signifies it. Here, the keyword is reality: 
the discussion about supposition becomes a matter of metaphysical frameworks. 
This understanding of supposition as a relation doesn’t intend to mix and 
ambiguate the matter of categories with the matter of properties of terms. I 
only intend to say that there are going to be parallel treatments between the 
category of relation and supposition4. There are subdivisions of supposition 
in which it is hard to understand the bridge between signification and suppo-
sition without an intermediate step that could be called intentional, as in the 
relatives of diversity. Also, if the category of relation is treated as a mere act of 
comparison of the intellect, it will have a parallel effect in what concerns the 
relation between signification and supposition. 
I don’t mean to say that we shouldn’t separate the two contexts. They are 
clearly distinct. Nonetheless, they have a parallel structure of treatment. I also 
don’t mean to make an interpretation of Petrus Hispanus. My only intention 
is to make patent what is promising about a text that will be used hundreds 
of times as a basis for further developments. And in fact, we can see this gaps, 
ambiguities and promises being developed in Petrus Hispanus’ commentators. 
Finally, I also want to claim that this two fields, namely the category of relation 
3. Just to give an example, in one of the seven fallacies extra dictionem, i.e., the fallacy named 
as accidens, Petrus Hispanus says the following: “Item: / ‘risibile est proprium / homo est 
risibile / ergo homo est proprium’; / nam homo accidit risibili, quia risibile ita est subiectum 
huius intentionis proprium quod non ratione hominis; et sic homo accidit risibili; et sic 
convertibile accidit convertibili” (Petrus Hispanus, VII, 114: 153).
4. It is interesting to notice that this two matters are so close to each other that some com-
mentators of the Tractatus felt the need to justify the place of categories in the order of the 
treatises. John Buridan and John Versor, among others, say that the treatise about categories 
should appear immediately before the treatise on supposition, as it is also about terms and 
their properties (Cf. Johannes Buridanus, 1998, 4.1.1.: 7; Petrus Hispanus and Johannes 
Versor, 1572: 207vE).
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